Mark VII Financial Consultants Corporation v. Dale Smedley and the First National Bank of Layton : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Mark VII Financial Consultants Corporation v.
Dale Smedley and the First National Bank of
Layton : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David A. Bean; Bean and Smedley; William Thomas Thurman; Scott C. Pierce; McKay, Burton and
Thurman; Attorneys for Appellees.
Jackson Howard; D. David Lambert; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis and Petersen; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mark VII Financial Consultants Corporation v. Smedley, No. 880606 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1385
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
A10
 O o 
DOCKET NO. g g -OhCVa 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL 
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, 
Defendant-Appellees. 
Case No. 880606-CA 
Category 14b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JURY VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HON. RODNEY S. PAGE, PRESIDING. 
DAVID A BEAN, for: 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South For Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, UT 84041 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
DEPOSITED BY-me 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG16 1990 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN and 
SCOTT C. PIERCE, for: 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Kennecott Building Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
DALE SMEDLEY 
FILED 
FEB 10 1989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
] N THT '-niTRT ''T' APPEALS 
OF THE STATE Of UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL 
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, 
Deienddnt-Appellees. 
,is«i I J, "'V.'hOfi-CA 
Cdl.eyoj v Ml* 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JURY VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HON. RODNEY S. PAGE, PRESIDING. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
DAVI^ « i,^ ,^ ,, for: 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South For Lai 
Layton, UT 84041 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMA* 
SCOTT C. PIERCE, for: 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Kennecott Building Suite 
Salt Lake City, UT 8413 3 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
DALE SMEDLEY 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I 
THE BANK DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY "RIGHTS" BY ITS 
CONSPIRACY WITH SMEDLEY 2 
POINT II 
THE BANK DID NOT PLEAD NOR WAS IT ENTITLED TO 
CLAIM ANY OFFSET OR RECOUPMENT 6 
CONCLUSION 7 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited; 
Caradonna v. Cunningham. Sponzo and Arseneau, M.D.S., P.C.. 
118 A.D.2d 1031, 500 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1986) 4 
Elder v. Triax Co. . 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1987) 6 
International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello 
Industrial Park Co.. 107 Idaho 1116, 695 P.2d 1255 
(1985) 4 
Kamer v. ITT Life Insurance Company. 33 A.D.2d 682; 305 
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1969) 4 
Security Management Company v. King. 132 Ga. App. 618, 208 
S.E.2d 576 (1974) 4 
Sturges v. Bennett. 47 Ariz. 470, 56 P.2d 1038 (1936). . . . 4 
White v. Jackson. 252 S.C. 274, 166 S.E.2d 211 (1969). . . . 3 
Other Authorities Cited; 
20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim. Recoupment, and Setoff § 10 
(1965) 6 
20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim. Recoupment, and Setoff § 126 
(1965) 3 
Black's Law Dictionary 1147 (5th ed. 1979) 6 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK VII FINANCIAL 
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION, 
I 
vs. 
ff-Appellant, 
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, 
Defendant-Appellees. 
Case No. 880606-CA 
Category 14b 
STATEMENT FACTS 
Appex j without transcript of 
the trial because .the errors asserted appellant mite L Lear 
from written record which exists. Defendant First National 
Bank Layton has responded estimony 
which was not admitted into evidence c? trial, and by otherwise 
attemiii i in i i iiniif" 1111 n version of the facts, which was rejected 
by the jury. factua isputes are M Vi i,ssue 
appeal. Appellant objects Bank's attempt to color the 
issut: ,.: e factual issues where the 
Bank has not appealed otherwise challenged the verdiei Mm 
jury. 
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 11 M M Uil ' II "ilN 11 Ml NT 
The Bank's primary claim is that, by virtue ^ « nnn-
,:: XL. acquired * became subrogated 
Smedley's rights with respect to plai 
without merit. There are no benefits awarded by the law to a 
conspirator. 
The distinction between recoupment and offset is of no 
significance in this case. Both recoupment and offset are 
available only to one who has a claim against the plaintiff. 
The Bank had no claim against the plaintiff, and was not 
entitled to offset or recoupment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BANK DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY "RIGHTS" 
BY ITS CONSPIRACY WITH SMEDLEY. 
The primary thrust of the Brief of Respondent First 
National Bank of Layton ("Bank Brief") appears to be that the 
Bank was entitled to the benefit of Smedley's offsets as a right 
flowing to the Bank by virtue of its conspiracy with Smedley: 
By finding conspiracy, the jury supplied the 
mutuality of obligation which plaintiff 
alleges is lacking as to the Bank and by 
becoming a co-conspirator, the Bank was 
entitled to all of the offsets that Smedley 
was entitled to. 
Bank Brief at 2. 
The Bank knew it did not have an independent 
cause of action that would support setoff or 
counterclaim and the Bank therefore had to 
rely upon Smedley's claim because that's 
what the Bank relied upon in getting 
involved in an attempt to salvage Smedley's 
equity. 
Bank Brief at 5. 
The jury was fully informed as to the 
participation of the Bank and the reasons 
therefore [sic] and by instructing the jury 
on conspiracy, upon a finding of conspiracy 
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the Bank became subrogated to all of the 
rights and obligations of Smedley. By 
asserting conspiracy, plaintiff puts the 
Bank in the same position as an equitable 
subrogee, putting the Bank in Smedley's 
shoes as to the conversion cause of action. 
Bank Brief at 6. 
But neither plaintiff nor the jury has a 
right to pick or choose only the liabilities 
of conspiracy and not the benefits that go 
with it. . • . [P]laintiff in alleging the 
conspiracy, and the jury in finding conspir-
acy to exist under the instructions given by 
the court, must also accord to the Bank as a 
co-conspirator all of the benefits to which 
Smedley was entitled. 
Bank Brief at 
»
 a c o u rt in equity was required to give 
the Bank some benefit « a result or s 
astounding 11- i «< surprising that the Bank has failed to 
novel proposition. 
Plaintiff has similarly been unable 
directly supporting contradicting the Bank's theory one 
would not expec1 - conspirator had 
attempted - claim that he had some legal rights as a resn 
:ic most closely analogous situation is that 
a partnership. Even among.lawi 
offset claimed by the Bank does not exist. When an indi\ 
person who also owes ,a debt: to the 
partnership, the individual partner general imt 11 n 
offset on his personal debt by reason f the plaintiff's debt to 
the partnership. .~. -ere1aim. Recoupment, and 
Setoff § 126 (1965); White v. Jackson, 252 S.C. 274, 1 66 S E, 2d 
211 (1969). See also Caradonna v, Cunningham, Sponzo and 
Arseneau, M.D.S.. P.C.. 118 A.D.2d 1031, 500 NoY.S.2d 404 
(1986); Security Management Company v, King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 
208 S.E.2d 576 (1974); Kamer v. ITT Life Insurance Company, 33 
A.D.2d 682; 305 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1969). 
This principle is also illustrated by the case of Sturges 
v. Bennett, 47 Ariz. 470, 56 P.2d 1038 (1936). The defendant in 
that case had executed a promissory note in favor of the 
plaintiff, who was an attorney. The promissory note had been 
executed in connection with litigation between the defendant and 
the plaintiff's client. The defendant and the plaintiff's 
client had been partners in a partnership. In defense to the 
action on the note, the defendant asserted that the prior 
litigation had been a "frame-up" between the attorney and his 
client which had the effect of depriving the defendant of most 
of his interest in the partnership. The court rejected the 
defendant's claims on several grounds, including that "[t]he 
counterclaim set up by the defendant against Allen [the client], 
even if proved, could not be an offset against a debt owed by 
defendant to Bennett, the plaintiff." 56 P.2d at 1040-41. 
The Bank also claims that it is entitled to some rights as 
a "equitable subrogee" of Smedley. (Bank Brief at 6.) The Bank 
cites as support for this proposition the case of International 
Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 107 
Idaho 1116, 695 P.2d 1255 (1985). That case quotes other 
authorities as follows: 
4 
Equitable subrogation is a legal device 
which permits a party who has been required 
to satisfy a loss created by a third-party's 
wrong to step into the shoes of the loser 
and recover from the wrongdoer. 
695 P.2d at 1258 (citations omitted). 
Under this rule cited by the Bank, the only way the Bank 
would be subrogated to Smedleyfs rights would be if the Bank 
had, pursuant to a contractual or other duty owed to Smedley, 
paid to Smedley the amount of any obligations owed by plaintiff 
to Smedley. The payment would need to have been compulsory; a 
voluntary payment does not entitle one to subrogation. The 
doctrine obviously has no application in this case. First, the 
Bank did not pay to Smedley any of plaintifffs obligations. 
Second, even if the Bank's payment of the GECC note were 
considered to meet the requirements, the payment was wholly 
voluntary. The Bank clearly was not an equitable subrogee of 
Smedley's rights against plaintiff. 
These authorities establish that even if the relationship 
between Smedley and the Bank was a legitimate, voluntary 
partnership, the Bank would not have been entitled to claim any 
offset based on an obligation owed by a plaintiff to Smedley. 
The authorities further establish that the Bank has not met the 
requirements of an equitable Subrogee. It is even more certain 
that the Bank, coming into court with the unclean hands of a 
conspirator, may not in good faith claim that the court in the 
exercise of its equitable powers is required to accord the Bank 
the "benefits11 of the Bank's conspiracy with Smedley. The trial 
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court erred in granting the Bank any offset based on Smedley's 
claims against plaintiff, 
POINT II 
THE BANK DID NOT PLEAD NOR WAS IT ENTITLED 
TO CLAIM ANY OFFSET OR RECOUPMENT. 
The Bank acknowledges that it did not claim any right to an 
offset in its pleadings. Bank Brief at 6. The Bank attempts to 
avoid this pleading defect by now claiming for the first time 
that its unplead defense was actually for recoupment, not 
offset. Bank Brief at 4. First, the Bank's claim is not 
properly labeled as recoupment. Second, even if the proper 
label is recoupment instead of offset, the distinction is 
without legal significance. 
"Recoupment" is a label used at common law to refer to a 
counterclaim arising out of the same transaction. It could not 
be the basis for affirmative relief, but only to reduce the 
amount of the plaintiff's recovery. Setoffs, in contrast, were 
based on unrelated claims and served as sources of affirmative 
relief. Elder v. Triax Co. , 740 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1987). 
The distinctions are of little modern significance. 20 Am. Jur. 
2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 10 (1965). 
The distinction between the two terms is concisely set 
forth in Black's Law Dictionary 1147 (5th ed. 1979) as follows: 
Set-off distinguished. A "set-off" is a 
demand which the defendant has against the 
plaintiff, arising out of a transaction 
extrinsic to the plaintiff's cause of 
action, whereas a "recoupment" is a reduc-
tion or rebate by the defendant of part of 
the plaintiff's claim because of a right in 
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the defendant arising out of the same 
transaction. 
(Citation omitted.) 
The distinction between setoff and recoupment, in other 
words, is based solely on whether or not the claim arises out of 
the same transaction. Setoff and recoupment are the same, 
however, in that both require that the claim be one owed to the 
defendant by the plaintiff. Neither setoff or recoupment 
permits a defendant to claim a benefit by reason of a debt the 
plaintiff may owe to another person. 
The foregoing and plaintiff's initial brief establish that 
the Bank was not entitled to a setoff based on amounts the 
plaintiff owed to Smedley. The trial court's award of such a 
setoff must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The offsets given to the Bank should be disallowed, and 
judgment entered for plaintiff for the value of the drill rig 
converted by the Bank. The case should also be remanded for a 
new trial on the issue of punitive damages for the reasons set 
forth in plaintiff's initial brief. 
DATED this 7th day of February, 1989. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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